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Abstract
Reward probability and uncertainty are two fundamental parameters of decision making. Whereas reward probability
indicates the prospect of winning, reward uncertainty, measured as the variance of probability, indicates the degree of risk.
Several lines of evidence have suggested that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) plays an important role in reward
processing. What is lacking is a quantitative analysis of the encoding of reward probability and uncertainty in the human
ACC. In this study, we addressed this issue by analyzing the feedback-related negativity (FRN), an event-related potential
(ERP) component that reflects the ACC activity, in a simple gambling task in which reward probability and uncertainty were
parametrically manipulated through predicting cues. Results showed that at the outcome evaluation phase, while both win
and loss-related FRN amplitudes increased as the probability of win or loss decreased, only the win-related FRN was
modulated by reward uncertainty. This study demonstrates the rapid encoding of reward probability and uncertainty in the
human ACC and offers new insights into the functions of the ACC.
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Introduction
Reward probability and uncertainty are essential parameters in
the computation of the utility function of a behavior choice [1,2].
Whereas reward probability crucially determines the expected
reward value associated with a behavior choice, reward uncer-
tainty, i.e., the variance of the probability distribution, provides an
estimate of the risk associated with the same choice. In non-human
primates, substantial evidence indicates that the midbrain
dopamine neurons encode the reward prediction signal that is
based on reward probability, as well as the reward prediction error
signal that is the difference between the actual and expected
reward [3–5]. The cues that predict higher reward probabilities
evoke larger phasic activations in the midbrain dopamine neurons.
Whereas the outcomes that are better than predicted (positive
prediction errors) evoke phasic activations in the dopamine
neurons, the outcomes that are worse than predicted (negative
prediction errors) evoke phasic inhibitions. In a seminal study,
Fiorillo et al. (2003) further showed that the midbrain dopamine
neurons encode reward uncertainty in their tonic discharges.
Recent fMRI studies reported similar encoding of reward
probability and uncertainty in the human midbrain regions [6,7].
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) receives projections from
the midbrain dopaminergic regions and has been proposed to play
an important role in reward processing. Event-related potential
(ERP) studies in humans found that an ERP component, called the
feedback related negativity (FRN), is sensitive to reward expecta-
tion error. The FRN, which peaks at around 300 ms and is
maximal at frontal-central scalp electrode sites, is likely being
generated in the ACC [8–10]. Consistent with this account, fMRI
studies of ACC have shown that the activity in ACC can reflect
reward prediction errors [11,12]. A recent fMRI study also found
that the ACC activity is modulated by the uncertainty of reward
environment during feedback monitoring and the degree of such
modulation predicts the learning rate across individuals [13],
suggesting that the ACC may track the reward uncertainty.
The goal of this ERP study is to use the FRN amplitude as a
measure of the ACC activity and perform a quantitative analysis of
the encoding of both reward probability and uncertainty in the
ACC. As the uncertainty is derived and calculated from the
probability [14], in most circumstance, these two factors are highly
correlated. Increasing the probability of win from 75% to 100%
not only changes reward probability but also decreases uncertainty
(i.e., 100% win is most certain). On the other hand, decreasing the
probability of win from 25% to 0% not only decreases reward
probability but also decreases the uncertainty (i.e., 0% win is most
certain). The uncertainty reaches its maximum when reward
probability is 50%. Above 50%, it decreases as reward probability
increases, whereas below 50%, it decreases as reward probability
decreases. Given these opposite directions of correlations, the
correlation between probability and uncertainty will be close to
zero if the win probability varies from 0 to 100%. In this study, to
ensure reward probability and uncertainty could be disassociated,
reward probability was varied over a wide range of probabilities
with a sufficient number of intermediate values (every 12.5% from
0 to 100%). Given the evidence that the ACC encodes both
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 12 | e29633reward probability and uncertainty in fMRI and the evidence for
the link between the FRN and the ACC [8–13], we predicted that
the FRN amplitude would be modulated by both reward
probability and uncertainty.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixteen undergraduate students (8 male; mean age 2262.5
years) participated in the gambling experiment. They were told
that their performance in the gambling task determined how much
they would be awarded or penalized on the top of a base payment
of 40 yuan (about US $6). Written, informed consent was obtained
from each participant, and the study was approved by the
Academic Committee of the Department of Psychology at Peking
University.
Experimental design
We used a modified version of a gambling task in which reward
probability and uncertainty were manipulated parametrically [14–
16] (Fig. 1). In each trial, participants were first presented with the
back side of two cards that were drawn without replacement
randomly from a deck of nine cards numbered between 2 to 10.
They were asked to guess within 3000 ms which card had a larger
number in order to win 0.5 yuan. A 0.5 yuan penalty was imposed
for late response. Participants were explicitly informed about this
rule and a visual feedback ‘‘too late, lose 0.5 yuan’’ was presented
to participants if they failed to respond within 3000 ms. At 700 ms
after participants’ response, the chosen card (called cue card) was
presented for 1000 ms. The winning probability was indicated by
the number of the cue card ranging from 2 to 10, which
corresponded to the winning probability of 0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375,
0.5, 0.675, 0.75, 0.875, and 1, respectively. Participants were
explicitly informed of these probabilities. At 700 ms after the offset
of the cue card, a sign of ‘‘+50’’ or ‘‘250’’ was presented for
1000 ms to indicate a win (and 0.5 yuan reward) or loss (and 0.5
yuan penalty) trial, respectively. We only presented the numeric
feedback without showing the original two cards in order to
control for the visual property of feedback stimuli. The next trial
began 1000 ms after the offset of the feedback in the previous trial.
The experiment consisted of 9 blocks of 96 trials with each cue
card being presented a total of 96 times. For each cue condition,
the proportion of trials for the win or loss outcome followed
exactly the probability indicated by the cue number. For example,
for the cue card 3, 12.5% trials would give the win feedback and
87.5% trials the loss feedback. There was a short break between
blocks.
For each condition, reward probability was indicated by the
number in the cue card, as we pointed out earlier. There are
several measures of uncertainty that are all maximal at P=0.5 and
minimal at P=0 or 1. In this study, uncertainty was defined as
reward variance, which is an inversely quadratic function of
probability [14,16]. Thus, reward uncertainty has a value of 0,
0.44, 0.75, 0.94, 1, 0.94, 0.75, 0.44 and 0 for reward probability
value of 0, 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.625, 0.75, 0.875 and 1,
respectively (Table 1). We used this measure in order to be
consistent with previous neuroimaging studies [14,16]. Uncertain-
ty was also measured as entropy [4] and similar effects were
observed. At the outcome stage, positive prediction error elicited
by actual win feedback was measured as 1 minus probability of
winning at the cue stage, whereas negative prediction error elicited
by actual loss feedback was measured as 1 minus probability of
losing at the cue stage (see Table 1). The uncertainty prediction
error was measured as the uncertainty at the cue stage minus 0 as
there was no uncertainty at the outcome stage (uncertainty
resolved). At the cue stage, two analyses were carried out: a one-
factor ANOVA analysis with 9 levels of probability and a
regression analysis with mean FRN amplitudes across participants
as dependent variable and reward probability and reward
uncertainty as two independent variables. Repeated measures
ANOVA analyses tested whether the FRN amplitude showed
significant linear or quadratic relationship with reward probability.
Since uncertainty, measured as reward variance, is an inversely
quadratic function of probability that is minimal at P=0 and P=1
and maximal at P=0.5, a significant quadratic effect would
suggest a significant relationship between uncertainty and FRN
amplitude. Degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity when the Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated. Note, because
uncertainty was calculated from probability, it was impossible in
ANOVA to examine both factor together, for example, controlling
probability while examining the effect of uncertainty. While the
ANOVA analyses examine the effect of probability or uncertainty
separately, linear regression analyses examine the effect of one
factor (e.g. probability) after controlling for the all other factors in
the model. Similar data analyses were carried out for the FRN at
the outcome stage.
ERP recording and analysis
EEGs were recorded from 64 scalp sites using tin electrodes
mounted in an elastic cap according to the International 10/20
system (NeuroScan Inc. Herndon, Virginia, USA). The imped-
ance of electrodes was maintained below 5 KV. Eye blinks were
recorded from the left supraorbital and infraorbital electrodes. The
horizontal electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from electrodes
placed 1.5 cm lateral to the left and right external canthi. All
Figure 1. Illustration of events and timing in a single trial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029633.g001
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left mastoid. The EEG and EOG were band-pass filtered
(0.05,70 Hz), sampled at 500 Hz and stored in hard disks for
off-line analysis.
Ocular artifacts were corrected with an eye-movement
correction algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983). All trials in which
EEG voltages exceeded a threshold of +/2 70 mV during the
recording epoch were excluded from analysis. The EEG data were
re-referenced offline to linked-mastoid electrodes by subtracting
50% of the signal in the right mastoid electrode from the signal in
each channel. The EEG signal was baseline corrected and further
band-pass filtered from 2,20 Hz (24 dB octave roll off). This was
to minimize the overlap between the FRN and other reward-
sensitive ERP components, particularly the P300, since it has been
known that the P300 is a closely associated slow wave ERP
response [17,18]. Epochs of 800 ms (with 200 ms pre-stimulus
baseline) EEG from each electrode were sorted by experimental
conditions.
At both cue and feedback phases, the FRN was measured as the
mean amplitude at Fz, where there was maximal effect of valence
(loss minus win), during the interval 275–325 ms after stimulus
presentation [19,20]. To confirm that our findings were not
affected by the particular time window we selected for the FRN,
we also reported the mean FRN amplitude during the interval
250–325 ms post-stimulus for cue conditions. The FRN was also
measured as the base to peak amplitude and a similar pattern of
effects was observed. We did not use the difference wave approach
since our aim was to quantitatively evaluate the relationship
between the FRN amplitudes and probability or uncertainty
rather than simply compare the FRN amplitudes in two
experimental conditions [21,22]. To assess the coding of reward
probability and uncertainty by the FRN, linear regressions were
performed using the mean FRN amplitude (in each condition) as a
dependent variable and reward probability and uncertainty as
independent variables.
Dipole Analysis
An attempt was made to localize the dipole sources of the ERP
components at the cue phase and the feedback phase. The cue
ERP waveform was generated by averaging all cue locked ERP
waveforms across all conditions. The win or loss ERP waveform
was generated by averaging all feedback locked ERP waveforms
across all win or loss conditions. Source localization was carried
out with the Brain Electrical Source Analysis program (BESA,
Version, 5.0) using a four-shell ellipsoidal head model. As
suggested [23], data were high-pass filtered (2 Hz) before dipole
fitting in order to remove slow drifts which could bias the resulting
solution.
For both cue and feedback locked ERP components, time
windows of 75 to 125, 150 to 200, and 250 to 350 ms post-
response, were chosen for the localization analysis of the N1, P2,
and FRN components, respectively. We use symmetric dipoles for
the localization analysis of the N1 and P2 components since early
sensory processes were likely to occur at both hemispheres. The
dipoles were fitted with no restriction on their direction and
location for each component and then fitted with fixed location for
the 0 to 350 interval covering all the ERP components.
Results
Cue-evoked FRN
For the cue-evoked FRN in the interval of 275–325 ms post-cue
presentation (Table 1 and Fig. 2A), ANOVA with 9 levels of
probabilities revealed a significant main effect of probability,
F(8,120)=3.57, p=0.016, a significant linear main effect, F(1,15)
=5.33, p=0.036, and a marginally significant quadratic effect,
F(1,15)=3.28, P=0.09. For the cue-evoked FRN in the interval
275–325 ms after cue presentation, similar ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of probability, F(8,120)=5.874, p=0.001, a
marginally significant linear main effect, F(1,15)=3.977, p=
0.065, and a significant quadratic effect, F(1,15)=10.657, p=
0.005. These results suggest that the FRN encodes reward
probability, such that smaller reward probability was associated
with larger FRN amplitude, as well as reward uncertainty,
although these effects are not robust.
Regression analysis on mean FRN amplitudes revealed that the
regression coefficient (Beta value) associated with reward proba-
bility was 0.74560.24 and the coefficient associated with reward
uncertainty was 20.55660.21. T tests revealed that both
coefficients were significantly different from zero (t=3.08, p=
0.022 for probability, and t=22.64, p=0.038 for uncertainty),
suggesting that cue-evoked FRN was modulated by both reward
probability and uncertainty. The coefficients indicated that the
FRN had larger amplitudes for smaller reward probabilities and
Table 1. The win probability and uncertainty for each of the nine conditions at the cue phrase and the reward prediction error and
uncertainty prediction error associated with win and loss outcomes.
Cue phase Actual wins in the outcome phase Actual losses in the outcome phase
Cue
number
Win
probability Uncertainty
FRN
amplitude
Positive
PE
Uncertainty
PE
FRN
amplitude
Negative
PE
Uncertainty
PE
FRN
amplitude
20 0 21.859 N/A N/A N/A 0 0 21.252
3 0.125 0.438 21.785 0.875 0.438 22.696 0.125 0.438 20.854
4 0.25 0.75 22.346 0.75 0.75 21.907 0.25 0.75 20.743
5 0.375 0.938 21.749 0.625 0.938 20.807 0.375 0.938 21.487
6 0.5 1 21.985 0.5 1 20.532 0.5 1 22.617
7 0.625 0.938 21.876 0.375 0.938 20.044 0.625 0.938 23.27
8 0.75 0.75 21.641 0.25 0.75 20.743 0.75 0.75 23.943
9 0.875 0.438 21.667 0.125 0.438 20.838 0.875 0.438 24.232
10 1 0 20.889 0 0 21.338 N/A N/A N/A
Grand mean FRN amplitudes (mV) during the interval 275–325 ms post-cue across participants are also presented. PE=prediction error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029633.t001
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explained by the model was high, with R
2=0.73, p=0.019. Note,
the uncertainty effect might be interpreted with caution, as the
effect may predominately driven by the P=1 condition. After
taking out the P=1 condition, there was no significant correlation
between FRN amplitude and reward probability or uncertainty (P
values .0.05).
For the interval 250–325 ms post-cue (Table 2), regression
analysis revealed that both probability coefficient (0.56560.26)
and uncertainty coefficient (20.78960.23) were significantly
different from zero (t=2.17, p=0.073 for probability, and
t=23.33, p=0.014 for uncertainty). The explanation power
was the same as the model on FRN data in the interval of 275–
325 ms post-cue.
Outcome-evoked FRN
ANOVA with two types of outcomes (win/loss) and 8 levels of
probabilities revealed a significant main effect of valence,
F(1,15)=16.39, P=0.001, a significant main effect of probability,
F(7,105)=12.91, P,0.001, and a significant interaction between
valence and probability, F(7,105)=5.37, P=0.002, suggesting that
the effects of outcome probability on FRN amplitude differ in win
and loss domain.
Figure 2. Grand-average ERP waveforms from channel Fz. ERPS were time locked to (A) the cue phase, (B) win outcome condition,
and (C) loss outcome condition. Please note, the outcome probability used in this figure refers to the actual outcome frequency. Thus low
probability indicates that the outcome is infrequent. For example, 25% probability in win condition refers to ‘actual win after the prediction of 25%
winning probability’, whereas 25% probability in loss condition refers to ‘actual loss after the prediction of 75% winning probability’. For clarity, only
waveforms for probabilities of 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% are presented. The topographic map of mean FRN at 300ms in the cue, win, and loss
conditions were also shown. (D) Coding of reward probability and reward uncertainty in cue-evoked FRN, and (E) outcome-evoked FRN. The
regression lines were computed based on the regression equations for each condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029633.g002
Table 2. The win probability and uncertainty for each of the
nine conditions at the cue phrase.
Cue
number
Winning
probability Uncertainty
FRN
amplitude
20 0 21.859
3 0.125 0.438 21.785
4 0.25 0.75 22.346
5 0.375 0.938 21.749
6 0.5 1 21.985
7 0.625 0.938 21.876
8 0.75 0.75 21.641
9 0.875 0.438 21.667
10 1 0 20.889
Grand mean FRN amplitudes (mV) during the interval 250–325 ms post-cue
across participants are also presented.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029633.t002
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significant linear main effect, F(1,15)=32.90, P,0.001, and a
significant quadratic, F(1,15)=7.56, P=0.015, suggesting that
win-evoked FRN encode both reward probability and uncertainty,
when examined separately. Consistent with the ANOVA analysis,
regression analysis revealed that the win-evoked FRN (Fig. 2B) was
significantly modulated by positive prediction error, t(7)=28.20,
p,0.001, and uncertainty prediction error, t(7)=7.89, p=0.001,
with a coefficient of 22.59660.32 and 2.23460.28 for positive
prediction error and uncertainty prediction error, respectively
(Fig. 2E, in blue. Note, the outcome probability in this figure refers
to the actual outcome frequency, as explained in the figure
caption). The regression coefficient associated with positive
prediction error indicated that the FRN had larger amplitudes
for infrequent win feedback, whereas the regression coefficient
associated with uncertainty prediction error indicated FRN
amplitudes were larger for the win outcome with lower reward
uncertainty. The proportion of the variance explained by the
model was very high, with R
2=0.947, p=0.001.
In the loss condition, tests of within-subjects contrasts revealed a
significant linear main effect, F(1,15)=9.71, P=0.007, and a non-
significant quadratic, F(1,15)=2.94, P=0.107, suggesting that loss
associated FRN encode reward probability but not uncertainty. In
consistent with the ANOVA analysis, regression analysis revealed
that the loss-evoked FRN (Fig. 2C) was significantly modulated by
negative prediction error, t(7)=7.70, p=0.001, with a coefficient
of 24.79560.62, but not by uncertainty prediction error (the
coefficient was 1.01160.56, t(7)=1.81, p=0.130). The proportion
of the variance explained by the model was high, with R
2=0.93,
p=0.001 (Fig. 2E, in red). Note, the regression coefficients
associated with reward prediction error were negative for both
win-evoked FRN and loss-evoked FRN, suggesting that infrequent
outcome evoked stronger negative-going FRN in both win and loss
domains.
Source analysis of the FRN
In the cue condition, the resulting five-source model accounts
for the data with a residual variance of 4.86% (Fig. 3A) and the
source of the cue-evoked FRN was located in the site of ACC
(x=10, y=5, z=37). In the win outcome condition, the resulting
five-source model accounts for the data in the period 0 to 350 ms
post onset of win feedback with a residual variance of 4.85% and
the source of the win-evoked FRN was also located in the site of
ACC (x=5, y=22, z=37). The same model for the win
condition also accounts for the ERP data in the loss condition
with a residual variance of 4.74%, suggesting that win and loss
ERPs have the same sources (Fig. 3B). Thus the dipole source
analysis further indicated an involvement of the ACC in the rapid
processing of reward probability and uncertainty signals.
Discussion
In this study, the FRN, as an indicator of the ACC activity, was
measured in a simple gambling task in which reward probability
and uncertainty could be dissociated. We provided, for the first
time to our knowledge, a quantitative analysis of the encoding of
reward probability and uncertainty in the human ACC. Our
results suggest that the cue-evoked FRN may encode reward
probability and uncertainty. While both win and loss-related FRN
amplitudes decreased as a function of outcome probability, only
the win-related FRN but not the loss-related FRN was modulated
by reward uncertainty. These results provide new insights into the
functions of the ACC in reward decision making.
Previous ERP studies have examined the encoding of reward
probability in the ACC. They only used limited number of
probability values (i.e. 25%, 50%, and 75%) and yielded
inconsistent findings [22,24–26]. Two studies found that negative
prediction errors evoked larger FRN amplitudes than positive
prediction errors [22,24]. While one study found that reward
probability only modulated the win-evoked FRN, but not the loss-
evoked FRN [25], another study found that reward probability
modulated neither the win-evoked FRN nor the loss-evoked FRN
[26]. The present study has two unique features that may allow us
to overcome the limitations of previous studies and provide a more
comprehensive analysis of the encoding of reward parameters in
the ACC. First, the reward probability information was explicitly
provided with a cue card and the feedback cannot be used to
optimize decisions. Thus our design minimized the possible
influence of asymmetric sensitivity to positive and negative
outcomes in learning [27,28]. Second, reward probability was
varied over a wide range of probabilities with a sufficient number
of intermediate values (every 12.5% from 0 to 100%) to ensure
that reward probability and uncertainty were disassociated.
The first main finding of this study was that the amplitudes of
the win- and loss-evoked FRNs all increased with outcome
probability, indicating that positive and negative prediction errors
were similarly encoded in the ACC. This finding challenges the
hypothesis that the ACC activity mirrors the activity of the
midbrain dopamine neurons in the encoding of reward prediction
error in win and loss conditions [29,30]. The reinforcement
learning theory of the FRN proposes that the FRN reflects the
impact of the midbrain dopamine signals on the ACC [29,30]; the
phasic changes in the midbrain dopamine activity are associated
with fluctuations in the FRN amplitude and negative and positive
prediction errors increase and decrease the FRN amplitude,
respectively [29,30]. The phasic decreases in dopamine inputs
elicited by negative prediction errors give rise to the increased
ACC activity that is reflected as larger FRN amplitudes. The
phasic increases in dopamine signals elicited by positive prediction
errors give rise to decreased ACC activity that is reflected as
smaller FRN amplitudes. While a linear correlation between the
negative prediction error and the FRN amplitude in this study is
consistent with earlier ERP studies [22,24,31–33], the linear
association of the larger FRN amplitude with larger (rather than
smaller) positive prediction error is a novel finding, which suggests
that positive prediction errors evoke a linear increase rather than
decrease in the ACC activity. It has been found that negative
feedback elicited a large FRN only when participants estimated
Figure 3. Sagittal, transversal, and coronal views of dipoles.
Dipoles were superimposed on MRI-based head models for grand-
average ERP waveforms in (A) cue phase and (B) outcome (win/loss)
phase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029633.g003
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had responded erroneously [34]. Further, false-positive feedback
presented after participants made large errors after erroneous trials
elicited a significantly larger FRN than negative feedback [34].
Our study extends these previous findings by further showing a
linear relationship between probability and FRN amplitude.
Violation of reward magnitude expectation was also found to
elicit larger FRN [35]. These results are consistent with recent
single unit recording studies in monkeys and humans that found
two groups of ACC neurons sensitive either to unexpected wins or
losses [36–38]. Taken together, these findings support the notion
that the ACC generally monitors violations in expectancy rather
than negative feedback per se [34].
The second main finding was that reward uncertainty was
encoded in the cue-evoked FRN and the win-evoked FRN.
Uncertainty is crucial to decision making and attention based
learning [1]. Different from monkeys’ midbrain dopamine neurons
that encode reward uncertainty by sustained and delayed signals
[4], the present study showed that reward uncertainty signals were
rapidly processed in the human ACC. This rapid encoding of
uncertainty may reflect the need for a rapid motivational
evaluation of the informativeness of stimuli. We found that larger
cue-evoked FRN amplitudes were elicited by cues indicating high
uncertainty in making reward prediction. This finding is consistent
with the notion that the FRN reflects motivational evaluation of
outcome since high uncertainty cues are less informative and thus
less rewarding to participants. This finding is also consistent with
an earlier fMRI study that also found stronger ACC activity to the
uncertainty of reward cues during reward anticipation [15]. The
uncertainty is resolved when outcomes are presented. The
resolution of high uncertainty should be more informative and
more rewarding than the resolution of low uncertainty. Indeed, for
the win outcome, compared with wins following more certain cues,
wins following uncertain cues are evaluated more positively,
indicated by the decreased FRN amplitudes (i.e., more positive
deflection). Our informativeness account is supported by the
evidence that human ACC activity in the outcome monitoring
phase is modulated by the volatility or uncertainty of the reward
environment [13]. Taken together, these findings highlight the
contribution of ACC in encoding uncertainty.
Some limitations in the present study are worth mentioning.
First, in the outcome phase, the numbers of trials change with
experimental conditions, raising the possibility that trial numbers
may contribute to the FRN patterns. However, a recent study
found that the FRN component rapidly stabilizes at 20 trials (or
even 10 trials in one experiment) in healthy populations [39],
indicating that increasing the number of trials after that would not
significantly change the FRN amplitude. Second, although the
objective reward probability associated with each cue card is
explicit, different participants might perceive them differently.
Moreover, participants may have irrational believe that their
actions could influence outcomes [40,41] and they may be
overoptimistic about the chances of winning [34]. How the
subjective probabilities might differ from objective probabilities is
an interesting question for future studies. Third, our interpretation
of associations between uncertainty and FRN amplitudes is
speculative. The exact mechanisms reflected in the FRN
amplitude/ACC activity are largely unknown. It is also currently
unknown why the uncertainty effect was significant for the FRN in
the win condition but not in the loss condition. Also, the
informativeness account cannot explain other FRN findings, such
as why the FRN is more negative for losses than for wins. Further
computational model-based studies are needed to resolve this
issue. Fourth, although the FRN has primarily been localized to
the ACC [8,42,43], there is no direct evidence to link the ACC
with the FRN. In fact, some studies have localized the FRN to the
striatum [44,45]. The mesocorticolimbic dopamine system, which
includes the midbrain, striatum, orbital frontal cortex, and medial
prefrontal cortex (e.g. ACC), has long been implicated in reward
processing [46]. It is possible that the FRN also reflects reward
processing in reward regions beyond the ACC [45]. Fifth, recent
studies suggest that modulation of the FRN amplitudes results
from the superposition on correct trials of a positive-going
deflection, known as reward positivity [21,47–49]. The reduction
in the FRN amplitude could have resulted from superposition of
the reward positivity that cancels out the FRN. Given that the
present study was not designed to test these possibilities, further
studies are necessary to examine the FRN using advanced
methods such as principal components analysis (PCA) [49]. Our
FRN findings at the cue phase could be driven by some peculiar
experimental conditions, and they are in need of replication before
conclusive arguments are made.
In summary, we demonstrate that reward probability and
reward uncertainty can be processed rapidly and discretely in the
human ACC at about 300 ms after stimulus presentation. An
integrated processing of uncertainty and probability enables
optimal inference and learning in a noisy and changeable
environment. Current models of the FRN should thus be modified
to take into account the uncertainty signal in the ACC.
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